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I. INTRODUCTION 
False advertising law has largely escaped constitutional scrutiny because courts 
consider false or misleading commercial speech outside the protection ofthe First 
Amendment. Even moderate First Amendment protection for truthful commercial 
speech, however, requires some constitutional policing ofthe line between truth and 
falsity. Current enforcement of false advertising law, whether administrative, as 
with the FDA's regulation of drug-related speech, or judicial, as with Lanham Act 
suits brought by private parties, is ill-equipped to deal with First Amendment 
doctrine's very different concerns, rules, and presumptions. This contribution to the 
symposium will explore some of the ways in which the First Amendment and 
trademark law-a type of false advertising law-differ in approach. Unlike most 
treatments of the subject through a First Amendment lens, this one does not begin 
with the presumption that the standard First Amendment approach is superior. 
Commercial speech, defined roughly as speech that proposes a commercial 
transaction,! has been easier for the government to regulate than political speech 
throughout the development of the modern First Amendment. Under the test set 
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission/ 
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Portions ofthis paper are adapted from 
Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LA WAND 
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds. 
forthcoming 2007). 
l. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (citing Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
2. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
737 
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government may regulate truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech about lawful 
activity if the regulation serves a substantial government interest, the regulation 
directly advances the government interest, and the regulation is no more extensive 
than necessary to serve that interest. 3 This is in contrast to noncommercial speech, 
which, even if false, can only be regulated under much more limited circumstances. 
The commercial/noncommercial divide has become increasingly controversial 
given the importance of commercial speech to modern social, economic, and even 
political life, with several Supreme Court Justices suggesting their willingness to 
abandon the distinction.4 Distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial 
speech regularly creates definitional problems.5 Yet the alternative of treating all 
falsifiable claims alike might be far less palatable, especially when we consider the 
range of commercial speech that is currently regulated to protect consumers against 
false or misleading claims.6 In particular, the Lanham Act and its state counterparts 
in trademark and unfair competition law could be profoundly affected as courts 
expand protections for commercial speech. 
In the past, courts have denied First Amendment protections to advertisers in 
trademark and false advertising cases, reasoning that trademark and false 
advertising laws pose no constitutional problems because they regulate only false 
and misleading commercial speech, which the Supreme Court said in Central 
Hudson could simply be banned.7 The expansion of trademark law to include 
protection against dilution,8 which operates even when consumers are not confused 
or deceived, puts obvious pressure on this reasoning.9 First Amendment concerns 
3. [d. at 564. 
4. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501, 512 (1996) (Stevens, 1, 
plurality); id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 518 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
5. Even for those who accept that commercial speech deserves less First Amendment protection 
than political speech, line-drawing can be problematic: What is an ad for an abortion clinic? What is 
an ad for Boeing praising the company's contribution to our nation's defense? The former question is 
far from theoretical, as anti-abortion groups have begun to sue abortion clinics for false advertising 
under consumer protection laws. See, e.g., LifeSite, http://www.lifesite.netlldn/2006/sep/06092109.html 
(last visited May 21, 2007) (discussing Expectant Mother Care Frontline Pregnancy suit against a New 
York abortion clinic). Likewise, state consumer protection laws have been used to regulate the claims 
of anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the New York State 
Attorney General, Spitzer Reaches Agreement with Upstate Crisis Pregnancy Center (Feb. 28, 2002), 
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/feb/feb28c _ 02.html (citing concerns of misleading 
advertising and business practices). 
6. See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 
U. ON. L. REV. 1181, 1183-85 (1988) (explaining that commercial speech encompasses not only 
commercial advertising but also a wide range of commercial communicative transactions). 
7. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563--64 (1980). 
8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.c. § 1125(c) (2000) (entitling owner ofa famous mark or trade name to 
injunction for dilution of the mark and also providing authorization for damages in the case of willful 
dilution). 
9. See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution Law as Unconstitutional Restrictions 
on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REv. 709, 710 (2007).1 have written about the relationship between 
commercial speech doctrine and dilution in Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law 
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). This piece will focus on traditional 
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have also arisen in trademark infringement claims against classic expressive media 
such as movies, which are not commercial speech for First Amendment purposes 
even when they are disseminated for profit. 10 Courts have invoked free speech 
considerations when evaluating claims against expressive works, and much 
commentary has focused on political or expressive uses of trademarks that 
trademark owners would prefer to suppress. Most First Amendment analysis ofthe 
Lanham Act thus attacks the Act's extension beyond protection against confusion 
in sales of ordinary goods and services. 11 
But the core of the Lanham Act-its prohibition of commercial uses of words 
and symbols that are confusingly similar to words and symbols used by other 
commercial entities l2-has remained largely unchallenged. This result is neither 
inevitable nor logical. The lines between confusing and informative and between 
true and false are difficult to draw; in other contexts-particularly libel 
doctrine-courts have therefore imposed increasing burdens on those entities, 
whether private or governmental, who would penalize defendants for speech that 
is deemed harmful because it is deemed false. As the Supreme Court makes it more 
difficult to prohibit truthful commercial speech, then, one likely consequence is an 
increased burden of proof on determinations that specific instances of commercial 
speech are false or misleading. 
II. BACKGROUND: FALSE ADVERTISING 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.,13 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects commercial 
speech because such speech has informational value for people trying to make 
decisions about how to live and even informs opinions on political issues. 14 
Increasingly, the Court has justified protection for commercial speech with 
reference to the speaker's interests, but I will focus here on the value ofthe speech 
to the recipient. Recipient-focused theories should allow more regulation of speech 
than speaker-focused theories, given that recipient-focused theories do not consider 
the commercial speaker to have a distinct autonomy interest in speaking about its 
trademark infringement law as a specific type offalse advertising. 
10. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that expression by 
means of a motion picture is protected under the First Amendment). 
11. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death a/Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1710-15 (1999) (arguing that courts should not construe the Lanham Act as a broad 
anti-copying statute partly because some commercial uses of a trademark are important in societal 
discourse). For an interesting exception, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First 
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REv. 1095, 1098-1101 (2003), in which she argues that current protections 
for descriptive marks with secondary meaning conflict with First Amendment rights. 
12. See Lanham Act, ch. 540, sec. 1,60 Stat. 427 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 
(2000)). 
13. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
14. See id. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial 
infonnation, that interest may be as keen, ifnot keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent 
political debate."). 
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products. IS 
Despite a number of recent cases striking down specific regulations,16 
commercial speech remains less protected than political speech. Regulations of 
truthful commercial speech may be suspect, but the Supreme Court tolerates far 
more incidental interference with commercial speech than with political speech. For 
example, commercial speakers have an interest in being allowed to communicate 
truthful information of their own choosing, but no First Amendment interest in 
keeping silent about any other facts, even if they are inconvenient. 17 Disclosure 
requirements raise the cost of speaking and may distract from the commercial 
speaker's intended message. Nonetheless, because the ultimate interest to be 
furthered is that of disseminating truthful information, and because the Court has 
given little weight to arguments that truthful commercial speech can be chilled by 
suppression of untruthful or misleading speech, the distortions produced by 
disclosure requirements are not of constitutional magnitude. 
The Court's tight focus on freeing truthful commercial speech goes back to the 
test articulated in Central Hudson, which has been much criticized but never 
successfully replaced. The test has four parts: (1) truthful, nonmisleading speech 
may be regulated when (2) the regulation serves a substantial government interest, 
(3) the regulation directly advances that government interest, and (4) the regulation 
is no more extensive than necessary.18 The government bears the burden of proof, 19 
which cannot be satisfied "by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a 
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must 
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact 
alleviate them to a material degree.,,2o One odd thing about the Central Hudson test 
is that a regulation will be sustained if it meets all four prongs of the test, or if it 
fails the first prong-that is, ifit deals with false or misleading commercial speech. 
15. See. e.g., Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and 
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 559 
(2006) ("Commercial speech receives diminished constitutional protection because '[t]he First 
Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. '" 
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980))). 
16. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002) (finding 
unconstitutional an FDA regulation that prohibited manufacturers from advertising compound drugs). 
17. See Zauderer V. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) ("Because the 
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to 
consumers ofthe information such speech provides, ... [a speaker's] constitutionally protected interest 
in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal." (citing Va. State Bd. 
o/Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764)). 
18. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
19. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) ("[T]he Government carries 
the burden of showing that the challenged regulation advances the Government's interest 'in a direct 
and material way.'" (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993))); Bolger V. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983) ("The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial 
speech carries the burden ofjustirying it." (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570-71)). 
20. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71 (citing cases discussing the government's burden). 
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In the latter case, the government may simply ban the speech.21 The government 
may regulate commercial speech that is "not provably false, or even wholly false, 
but only deceptive or misleading" to keep "the stream of commercial information 
flow[ing] cleanly as well as freely.,,22 
For years, courts and commentators have assailed the Supreme Court's 
commercial speech jurisprudence as incoherent at best and anathema at worst. The 
controversy, however, has focused on the second through fourth elements. On the 
threshold issue of how one determines truth for constitutional purposes, the 
Supreme Court has been all but silent, and the academic literature generally little 
better.23 
The Supreme Court has been most attentive to the line between true speech and 
false or misleading speech in the context of regulating advertising for professional 
services,24 a field in which it probably has reason to feel more comfortable 
assessing the likelihood of deception than in other areas. For example, in Ibanez v. 
Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation,25 the Court stated that 
the government may not assert that commercial speech is "potentially misleading" 
to ban it; rather, the government must prove that the speech is actually or inherently 
misleading.26 
21. As Robert Post points out, misleading speech might be commercial speech that can be 
regulated, or it might instead be excluded from the category of "commercial speech" and entirely 
outside the First Amendment's coverage, much like contract law and warranties presently. See Robert 
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1,21 (2000); Schauer, supra 
note 6. at 1183-84. 
22. Va. State Ed. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72. 
23. See. e.g., Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALEJ. ON REG. 85, 130 
(1999) ("In most applications of Central Hudson, the first and second prongs of the test are not at issue. 
The first prong, concerning whether the speech involves a lawful activity and is not misleading, is 
generally uncontroversial."). There are a few exceptions in the literature of false advertising law, but 
essentially nothing in the literature of trademark. See, e.g., Lillian R. Be Vier, Competitor Suitsfor False 
Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 
1,22-25 (1992) (describing judicial discretion in interpreting what constitutes false advertising under 
the Lanham Act); Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific 
Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1454-56 (1990) 
(describing situations where government regulation of a product's health claims might or might not 
deserve First Amendment protection); Troy, supra, at 130 ("One troubling question that does arise ... 
is the breadth of the government's power to restrict speech on the grounds that it is 'misleading. "'). 
24. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,202 (1982) ("The public's comparative lack of 
knowledge, the limited ability of the professions to police themselves, and the absence of any 
standardization in the 'product' renders advertising for professional services especially susceptible to 
abuses that the States have a legitimate interest in controlling."); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart 
Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 630 (1990) ("Lawyer advertising, 
initially an area covered by mainstream commercial speech jurisprudence, became the subject of so 
many cases that it developed into its own distinct area of common law .... At present, the law of 
attorney advertising has grown to such an extent that it has been able to seal itself off from its roots in 
first amendment theory .... "). 
25. 512 U.S. 136 (1994). 
26. See id. at 146 ("[The government's] burden [is] to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are 
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree. '" (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 
507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993))); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 (holding that state regulators could 
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The Court left itself much room for maneuver by indicating that some speech 
is "inherently" misleading without explaining how that category should be defined. 
Sometimes the Court has approved broad prophylactic rules against whole 
categories of commercial speech, such as in-person solicitation by a lawyer that is 
"inherently" likely to involve deception or other misconduct.27 By contrast, Peel v. 
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission28 held that, when lawyers' 
statements about their certifications and specializations could confuse clients, the 
state could require a disclaimer or could screen certifying organizations, but could 
not "completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading,"29 
again without explaining how to determine misleadingness. 
The most we know is that, unsurprisingly, the lawyers on the Court favor more 
words rather than fewer-the Court's preferred cure for incomplete or unqualified 
claims is more disclosure.3o In another lawyer advertising case, the Court held that 
government "may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially 
misleading information ... if the information also may be presented in a way that 
is not deceptive.,,31 Yet even that knowledge is uncertain; the Court has also said 
that "there is no First Amendment rule ... requiring a State to allow deceptive or 
misleading commercial speech whenever the publication of additional information 
can clarify or offset the effects of the spurious communication."32 Moreover, the 
academic research on disclosures and disclaimers reveals that they are rarely 
effective when the main message of an ad is confusing or misleading.33 Even 
disclaimers that are, on their face, clear and unambiguous rarely affect consumer 
ban commercial speech "when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is 
inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse"). 
27. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978). 
28. 496 U.S. 91 (1990). 
29. [d.atIIO. 
30. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977). 
31. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203; see also id. (suggesting that the state should require a disclaimer 
or disclosure as its first choice of remedy for deception). 
32. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I, 12 n.11 (1979); see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 466 
(holding that a state could ban in-person solicitation for profit "under circumstances likely to pose 
dangers that the State has the right to prevent" without showing actual harm to a particular client, and 
a broad rule was acceptable because the dangers would materialize often, perhaps "more often than 
noC). 
33. See, e.g., AlanR. Andreasen, Consumer Behavior Research and Social Policy, in HANDBOOK 
OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 459, 482-83 (Thomas S. Robertson & Harold H. Kassarjian eds., 1991) 
(arguing that consumers do not often use disclaimers in making decisions); Jacob Jacoby & George J. 
Szybillo, Why Disclaimers Fail, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 224, 226 (1994) (listing reasons, including 
inattention and information overload, why consumers may not receive messages that sellers direct at 
them); CorneliaPechmann, Do Consumers Overgeneralize One-Sided Comparative Price Claims, and 
Are More Stringent Regulations Needed?, 33 J. MARKETING RES. 150, 157 (1996) (finding that even 
disclosures explicitly correcting erroneous inferences about price superiority were ineffective when the 
test ad also made favorable price comparisons); Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics, 
the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and the Office of Policy Planning of the FTC, Sept. 13,2002, at 
16, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/fdatextversion.pdf [hereinafter FTC Comments] C'[T]est results 
suggest that consumers may misconstrue some qualifying disclosures as part ofthe seller's promotional 
message, thereby reinforcing rather than limiting the claim. "). 
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perceptions in the overall context of advertising or packaging.34 Worse, disclosures 
and disclaimers can backfire, conveying precisely the opposite message than 
intended and reinforcing the original falsehood.35 
Regulatory skeptics are attracted to the idea that government must prove 
uncorrectable misleadingness before it can ban speech.36 One problem with paying 
attention to what empirically misleads consumers, however, is that consumers are 
easily misled. Tn an ad-cluttered world in which it is rational to devote limited time 
to comprehending and evaluating most ad claims, significant and persistent 
misunderstanding is widespread-all but universal, in fact. 37 If we took 
misleadingness seriously, government could ban almost all factual advertising 
because of the significant potential for misunderstanding of any factual claim. 
Because banning factual ads is unlikely undesirable despite the inevitability of 
some consumer deception, false advertising law has a number of doctrines designed 
to separate legitimate from illegitimate sources of misunderstanding.38 These are 
most developed in the specialized branch of advertising law that is trademark 
infringement law. Descriptive fair use, which allows competitors to use terms that 
are literally truthful descriptions of their products even if that generates some 
confusion with trademarks incorporating those terms, is one such limiting 
doctrine.39 Nominative fair use is a related concept allowing commercial use of 
34. See, e.g., KaylaFriedmann, The Effect of Adding Symbols to Written Warning Labels on User 
Behavior and Recall, 30 HUM. FACTORS 507 (1988) (reporting that even when consumers notice 
disclaimers, they are unlikely to use them); Gita Venkataramani Johar & Carolyn J. Simmons, The Use 
of Concurrent Disclosures to Correct InvalidInferences, 26 J. CONSUMERREs. 307,320 (2000) (fmding 
that, because of cognitive processing limitations, "obviously effective disclosures (e.g., those that are 
encoded, those that are explicit, etc.) are often ineffective"); David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, 
Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis of Empirical 
Research, 13 1. PUB. POL'y & MARKETING I, 10 (1994) (summarizing various studies that found 
consumers often ignore warning labels even when they read and understand the warnings). 
35. See, e.g., FTC Comments, supra note 33, at 40 n.68 ("[I]nformation intended to disclose high 
levels of an undesirable nutrient like saturated fat, often led consumers to believe instead that the food 
had low or healthy levels of the nutrient."). 
36. See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 120 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding unjustified the 
FDA's characterization of the health claims at issue in the case as "inherently misleading"). 
37. See JACOB JACOBY & WAYNE D. HOYER, THE COMPREHENSION AND MISCOMPREHENSION OF 
PRlNTCOMMUNICATIONS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MASS MEDIA MAGAZINES 110-12 (1987) (finding that 
consumers aftinnatively misunderstood an average of 19% of messages in magazine ads; no ad 
correctly conveyed its message to all readers, while only 3 of I ,347 respondents completely understood 
all four readings on which they were quizzed); JACOB JACOBY, WAYNE D. HOYER, & DAVID A. 
SHELUGA, MIS COMPREHENSION OF TELEVISED COMMUNICATIONS 64-73 (1980) (fmding that consumers 
misunderstood an average of 28.3% of messages in television commercial ads; 81.3% of consumers 
misunderstood at least some portion of those ads, and no ad was completely understood by every 
consumer). 
38. See, e.g., Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 209 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(distinguishing advertising that is misleading from advertising that includes facts that are "susceptible 
to misunderstanding"). 
39. See KP Pennanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. Ill, 118 (2004). 
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another's trademark to identify the topic of discussion.40 Other rules allow most 
forms of comparative advertising using another party's mark,41 discount confusion 
that results from pure miscomprehension,42 and generally deem confusion that 
affects under 20% of consumers to be below the threshold required to find 
trademark infringement in the absence of other persuasive evidence of likely 
confusion.43 Currently, however, with the exception of nominative fair use, those 
doctrines exist to balance consumer protection with free competition rather than to 
implement First Amendment norms. The next section examines trademark 
infringement law as commercial speech regulation and finds a number of 
inconsistencies. First Amendment commercial speech doctrine and trademark law 
cover the same subject matter but make entirely different assumptions about 
government's role in determining the truth. 
TIT. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
A. First Amendment Precedents 
The Supreme Court has confronted the First Amendment implications of 
trademarks only in unusual factual and legal situations, which has not helped it go 
beyond its inconsistent and shallow treatment of deception in commercial speech 
cases. In Friedman v. Rogers,44 the Court held that a state law banning the practice 
of optometry under a trade name was constitutional because the ban furthered the 
state's interest "in protecting the public from ... deceptive and misleading" 
practices.45 The Court distinguished trade names from the commercial speech it had 
recently held deserved First Amendment protection.46 Statements about products 
or services and their prices are "self-contained and self-explanatory," but trade 
names have "no intrinsic meaning.,,47 Trade names provide no information about 
price or service until they acq uire meaning over time. 48 But the Court offered a false 
distinction. All words, at least the non-onomatopoetic ones, lack inherent meaning. 
If a trade name or other mark can convey misleading information, it can also 
40. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307-09 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (applying the nominative fair use doctrine to two newspaper polls asking readers to identifY 
their favorite member of a boy band). 
41. See, e.g., August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618-20 (7th Cir. (995) (holding 
that comparative advertising is an acceptable use of a competitor's mark). 
42. See, e.g., Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 56 (D. Mass. 1993) (discounting 
customer confusion of the seller of Dead Dog t-shirts with the Black Dog Tavern); Inc. Publ'g Corp. 
v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 397 (S.D.N.Y. (985) (dismissing the likelihood of 
confusion of magazines offering similar content because of sufficiently differing marks), ajJ'd, 788 F.2d 
3 (2d Cir. 1986) (table decision). 
43. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 32: 188 (4th ed. 2007). 
44. 440 U.S. 1 (1979). 
45. Id. at 15. 
46. Jd. at 12-13. 
47. Jd. 
48. Id. 
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convey truthful information, depending on the circumstances. 
Nonetheless, the Court was certain that the factual (as opposed to emotional or 
potentially misleading) information associated with a trade name could be 
communicated directly by advertising price, available services, or the fact of a joint 
practice.49 By contrast, the Court feared that trademark associations with price and 
quality remain ill-defined and could be manipulated by trademark owners, creating 
a significant possibility that trade names would be used to mislead, for example, by 
keeping the same name when staff change.5o 
Thus, the Court credited lower courts' findings that Rogers had used a trade 
name "to convey the impression of standardized optometrical care" even though he 
did not exercise supervision or control of the services rendered at the various 
offices using the trade name.51 Notably, trademark law would find such a mark 
invalid for abandonment, 52 though that would not stop the offices from using it. The 
trademark rule suggests a more targeted solution: prohibit use of trade names 
without quality contro1.53 But the Court did not credit that alternative, probably 
because it was skeptical of the benefits of trade names generally. Even if use of a 
trade name was not misleading, it would still "facilitate the large-scale 
commercialization which enhances the opportunity for misleading practices. ,,54 This 
apparent opposition to modern industrial practices is part of Friedman's pervasive 
conflict with trademark's rationale. 
Decided before Central Hudson, Friedman reflects several presumptions that 
are inconsistent with subsequent commercial speech doctrine and with the dominant 
theory of efficiency that justifies trademark protection generally, which the Court 
later endorsed. 55 By treating short-term opportunities to deceive through changes 
in quality as more important than long-term incentives to provide a consistent 
product, the Court missed the informational efficiency oftrademarks, the ability to 
encapsulate in a word or image a constellation of qualities. By serving as shorthand, 
trademarks make it easier for consumers to recognize the goods and services they 
want. The rule in Friedman required longhand, and the result was, at least 
49. See id. at 16. 
50. See id. at 12-13. A shady optometrist can use a new trade name if negligence or misconduct 
tarnishes the old one, or he can use different trade names for multiple shops to "give the public the false 
impression of competition among the shops." [d. at 13. 
51. [d. at 14. 
52. See. e.g., Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing lack of 
control as evidence of abandonment). 
53. See id. 
54. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 15. 
55. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) ("In principle, 
trademark law, by preventing others from copy ing a source-identifying mark, 'reduce[ s 1 the customer's 
costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,' for it quickly and easily assures a potential 
customer that this item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer as other similarly 
marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a 
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards 
associated with a desirable product. The law thereby 'encourager s 1 the production of quality products,' 
and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's 
inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale." (citations omitted». 
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according to standard trademark theory, information that was more difficult to 
process, meaning that consumers had more difficulty satisfYing their preferences.56 
Under Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, disallowing trade names as shorthand is 
a harm to free circulation of relevant information in the marketplace-here the 
information that optometric services can be standardized and provided at consistent 
quality across offices. 
Tn its only return to analyzing the relationship between trademark law and free 
speech, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 57 
the Court stated that trademark laws that "regulat[ e] confusing uses" of marks are 
constitutional because the government "may regulate 'deceptive or misleading' 
commercial speech."s8 That reasoning, combined with the idea that trademarks are 
valuable property, ended the inquiry. There is no free speech right to use another's 
property, at least when there are adequate alternative channels for the defendant-
speaker to use to convey its message. Lower courts have explicitly applied similar 
property reasoning to ordinary trademarks,59 though the Supreme Court addressed 
itself only to the special laws protecting the Olympic marks. For example, the 
Second Circuit found that a pornographic film did not need to use the Dallas 
Cowboys cheerleaders' trademarks when it could have depicted a fictional team 
instead.60 
The property argument is entirely unimpressive with respect to noncommercial, 
expressive uses. It is dangerous to let legislatures or common law define intangibles 
as "property" to fend off First Amendment challenges. A reputation can be called 
property as easily as a trademark-indeed, they are much the same thing-and yet 
libel law is pervasively constrained by the First Amendment. 
Property concepts are perhaps more persuasi ve with respect to commercial uses 
56. The best defense of the Court's reasoning might be that personal services like optometry 
cannot be prov ided consistently by a large company, but trademark law does not make this distinction, 
and even so that would mean Friedman had no bearing on First Amendment claims for trademarks in 
mass-market goods or services, like Starbucks coffee. 
57. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
58. Jd. at 535 n.12 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 771). The law at issue in San Francisco Arts & Athletics was not an ordinary trademark law, 
but whether the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) could ban any unauthorized use ofthe term 
"Olympic" for, among other things, nonprofit sports competitions. Jd. at 524-25. The Court found that 
"Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols 
are likely to be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized uses, even if not confusing, 
nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value ofthe 
marks." [d. at 539. With respect to the specific use of the term to promote the Gay Olympics, the court 
found the possibility of confusion "obvious." Jd. The Court, nonetheless, did not directly engage the 
first prong of Central Hudson, and thus did not say that possible confusion satisfies the "false or 
misleading" test. Instead, the Court applied the O'Brien test for evaluating content-neutral regulations. 
See id. at 535-37 & 537 n.16 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
59. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Lloyd 
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (declaring that the insurance company's trademarks were 
property and protected from use "where adequate alternative avenues of communication exisC)). 
60. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
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that seek to use a term to attract consumers in the same way as the trademark owner 
does. The adequate alternative channels concept has some echoes within trademark 
doctrine, which looks to whether a term is necessary for competition to see whether 
it should be regarded as generic (and thus unprotectable as a trademark), descriptive 
(and thus protectable only to the extent that consumers learn to see it as an indicator 
of source), suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. Even so, the label "property" does not 
solve boundary problems-for example, whether trademark rights should bar a 
defendant's use of a mark on noncompeting goods. In the past, courts using 
property rhetoric for trademarks limited that property right to actual sales diversion, 
but now trademark rights extend whenever consumers are likely to perceive an 
association between producers, even without competition.61 
Friedman and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, as others have noted, are out of 
line with the Court's more recent treatment of commercial speech as having 
substantial value.62 As the Court held in Edenfield v. Fane, 63 to sustain a regulation 
of nonmisleading speech, the government "must demonstrate that the harms it 
recites are real.,,64 If the government can avoid that requirement by simply asserting 
that the harm is that the speech is misleading, hardly any protection for commercial 
speech will be left. It is easy to recast a concern about the persuasive effects of 
speech as a concern that the speech misleads consumers by obscuring the relevant 
facts. Despite that, the Court accepted blanket legislative judgments in both 
Friedman and San Francisco Arts & Athletics. Lower courts have consistently 
followed the same cursory analysis with respect to traditional trademark 
infringement: confusing uses are misleading and therefore may be enjoined without 
consideration of First Amendment interests. 65 The only exceptions involve creative 
works such as music and movies, whose uses of marks sometimes lead courts to 
invoke free speech concerns.66 
61. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. (forthcoming 2007). 
62. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I, 25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Robert N. Kravitz, 
Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131, 166-67 (1989). 
63. 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
64. Id. at 770-71. 
65. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir.1992) 
(finding that misleading commercial speech may be restricted without violating the First Amendment 
(citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001,1022 (9th Cir. 1985»); Kelley 
Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 291 (C.D. Cal. 1992); see also, e.g., Robert C. 
Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 165-66 (1982) (,'Reliance on the confusion 
rationale as the primary basis ofliability has effectively insulated traditional trademark doctrine from 
constitutional attack."); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE LT. 147,221 (1998) (,The strongest constitutional justification 
for trademark laws is that, properly construed, they prevent only commercial speech that is likely to 
cause consumer confusion, and that false or misleading commercial speech can be restricted. "). 
66. See, e.g., Mattel,Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894,902 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
reference to marks in a song title is protected by the First Amendment so long as the "title clearly is 
relevant to the underlying work," and "does not explicitly mislead as to the source ofthe work"); Cliffs 
Notes,Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he 
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B. Application in More Conventional Trademark Cases 
1. The Problem of Partially Useful Information 
Even conceding that protecting consumers against deception as to source is a 
compelling government interest,67 many of trademark law's core presumptions 
would disappear if the field were subject to the same analysis as other kinds of 
commercial speech regulations. In Zauderer, for example, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the First Amendment requires that government interventions into the 
commercial speech market be minimal-disclaimers and disclosures are preferred 
alternatives to suppressing speech.68 Although the Second Circuit briefly flirted 
with using disclaimers to avoid consumer confusion caused by similar trademarks, 
disclaimers are not the default remedy in infringement cases, as they would be if 
courts applied commercial speech doctrine.69 
The deeper conflict between trademark law and the modern First Amendment 
is that information is rarely completely helpful or completely misleading. The idea 
that prohibitions on fraud improve the information environment depends on truth 
and falsity being pure binaries. Many trademark (and false advertising) cases, 
however, are more complicated. A mark may convey useful information to some 
while misleading others. Eliminating a use that misleads 15% of consumers but 
helps 30% of consumers may make the market less efficient overall, whereas an 
expressive element of parodies requires more protection than the labeling of ordinary commercial 
products."); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the Lanham Act applies 
"to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public 
interest in free expression"). 
67. Though it may not be compelling, if the goods or services are of equal quality. Judge 
Kozinski, who supports full constitutional protection for commercial speech, nonetheless describes 
trademark infringement as "essentially a fraud on the consuming public" and thus enjoinable without 
concern for the First Amendment. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905. But others have argued that there is no public 
interest in prohibiting misrepresentations that do not affect the physical quality of a product or service 
since consumers suffer no material loss. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 280 (Cal. 2002) 
(Brown, J., dissenting) C'A blanket prohibition offalse or misleading representations [that are unrelated 
to the characteristics of the product] would be unconstitutional because the prohibition may stifle the 
ability of businesses to comment on public issues."); cf lnfl Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 
67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding "consumer curiosity" is an insufficient justification to override 
businesses' First Amendment interests in not disclosing that their milk came from cows given certain 
hormones). Not getting what you want while still getting the benefit of your bargain can be seen as a 
psychic harm that cannot count in a First Amendment analysis. 
68. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (finding that "because 
disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions 
on speech, 'waming[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... in order to dissipate the 
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.'" (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,201 (1982))). 
69. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 100 I n.9 (2d Cir. 1989) (avoiding the question of 
whether a disclaimer cured an otherwise deceptive title where the court found the public interest in free 
expression was not outweighed by the public interest of avoiding consumer confusion). 
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injunction would be justified if the percentages were reversed.70 
The problem may be easiest to see for descriptive terms that have acquired 
secondary meaning. For example, Park 'n Fly is the name of an airport parking lot, 
which conveys information about the seller's services but may also serve as an 
indicator of a specific source. If another parking lot advertises "Park and Fly!" 
many consumers will get useful information, but many others may assume that the 
lot is a branch of the Park 'n Fly chain. Similar instances in which some consumers 
are informed and others are misled can occur with resale of used goods that may 
differ from the factory-original product, or sale of new products which advertise 
truthfully that they incorporate other trademarked goods, in which case some 
consumers may believe that the trademark owner endorses the new product. 
Comparative advertising or claims that "If you like X®, you'll love Y" can help 
some consumers make informed choices between competitors while leading others 
to conclude that a favorite brand has a new product available.7 ! 
The problem of suppressing partially useful information exists independent of 
whether there is any chilling effect from the existence of government regulation and 
competitor lawsuits. But of course chilling effects do exist. A reseller's fear of 
being sued by the original manufacturer, a competitor's fear that Health Selections 
frozen dinners will motivate a lawsuit by Healthy Choice, and similar reasonable 
apprehensions are likely to deter the adoption and use of marks in contexts where 
they would inform some consumers. This chilling effect is increased because a 
defendant's good faith bel iefthat marks are not confusing, founded in a study ofthe 
relevant market and a trademark search, is insufficient to avoid liability if a court 
disagrees with the defendant's evaluation. 
A trademark owner's ability to deter competitors' truthful, useful commercial 
speech is not the same thing as the ability to suppress political speech. But if it is 
true that commercial speech is as relevant and vital to modern citizens as political 
speech, then suppressing competition is analogous to silencing political opponents 
and certainly merits skepticism. Like partisan officials deciding which political 
speech to pursue, trademark owners may see harm where there is only competition. 
The paradoxical consequence of this is that infringement law is most dangerous, 
from the perspective of commercial speech doctrine, at its core-as applied 
between competitors. That is, a plaintiffs motives are most likely to include the 
70. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. I, 20-21, 42-43 (1992) 
(suggesting that victims of false advertising in the industry prefer damage remedies over injunctive 
relief: whereas victims oftrademark infringement need injunctive reliefsince reputational hann is more 
difficult to estimate than loss of sales alone ).lnjunctive relief as a mechanism for trademark protection 
is generally more justified. See id. at 20-21. 
71. Tn cases in which the defendant's use of a mark conveyed infonnation to some consumers, 
the First Amendment argument for required disclaimers is strongest. Tn such cases, a simple injunction 
against use deprives the nonconfused market participants, who may well be the majority of consumers, 
of valuable infonnation about the goods. Commercial speech doctrine requires the government to try 
a more moderate solution than total suppression. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 ("[W]aming[s] or 
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer 
confusion or deception."). 
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desire to suppress truthful speech when it sues a competitor. 
2. Problems in Determining Deception: Who Decides? 
Separately, the consequences of rigorous commercial speech protection for 
federal trademark registration, which is a governmentally conferred benefit that 
provides many advantages in enforcement, could be dramatic.72 Registration of 
deceptive marks is barred by the Lanham Act along with scandalous or disparaging 
marks.73 But the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) uses limited 
evidence to make a deceptiveness determination and has no particular expertise in 
assessing consumer behavior or understanding. A recent case, Piazza's Seafood 
World, LLC v. Odom/4 suggests the potential effects of robust commercial speech 
protection on the overall trademark system. The plaintiff sold Chinese-farmed 
catfish under the trade names "Cajun Boy" and "Cajun Del ight" and imported 99% 
of its products from overseas.75 Louisiana's "Cajun Statute" provided, "No person 
shall advertise, sell, offer or expose for sale, or distribute food or food products as 
'Cajun', 'Louisiana Creole', or any derivative thereof unless the food or food 
product [was] produced, processed, or manufactured in Louisiana .... ,,76 
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that "Piazza's use of the 
'Cajun Boy' and 'Cajun Delight' trade names was only potentially misleading, not 
actually or inherently misleading, because Piazza largely sells its products to 
wholesalers and it labels its products with their country of origin.'m The judges 
presumably deemed wholesalers to be sophisticated and attentive to country-of-
origin labeling. Though the state's interest in preventing deception was substantial, 
the statute went further than necessary to serve that interest because there was no 
72. The current statutory provision for refusing registration on grounds of scandalousness or 
disparagement in 15 U .S.C. § 1 052(a) is particularly hard to reconcile with Central Hudson's protection 
for truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech. See, e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of 
Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man's 
Vulgarity Be Another's Registered Trademark?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 345-47 (1993) (providing 
examples of marks refused for registration because of their scandalous nature); Llewellyn Joseph 
Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark 
Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. TNTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187,231 (2005) (arguing that "section 
2(a) violates the First Amendment rights of those who wish to use scandalous or immoral marks in the 
course of their commercial enterprises"); Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment Bar 
Cancellation of RED SKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 665, 677-79 (2000) (suggesting that, because denial 
of registration for scandalous and disparaging marks reduces the financial value of the marks, First 
Amendment scrutiny should be applied to section 2(a) to protect forms of expression that may be 
discouraged by fmancial disincentives). 
73. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 428, amended by 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4982 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.c. 
§ 1052(a) (2000)). 
74. 448 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 2006). 
75. Id. at 747. 
76. Id. at 747 & n.7. 
77. Id. at 753. 
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actual deception in this case.78 As a result, the law, as applied to the plaintiff, 
flunked the test set forth in Central Hudson. 79 
The reason this case deserves attention from trademark scholars is that the 
Lanham Act and coordinate state laws do not distinguish between potentially and 
inherently misleading commercial speech. Imagine what would happen if the 
plaintiff sought to register its "Cajun Boy" mark and was denied using the PTO's 
test for deceptiveness, which does not require the examiner to show actual 
deception. so Under the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the plaintiff would have a First 
Amendment right to the benefits of federal registration. 
Another recent case, this one featuring an opinion by one of the nation's most 
highly respected judges, illustrates the serious institutional questions raised by 
administrative determinations of falsity-mainly, though, by dodging those 
questions. In Native American Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp}] Judge Posner analyzed 
the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA),S2 which bans selling a product "'in a manner 
that falsely suggests it is ... an Indian product.",s3 The court of appeals reversed 
a district judge's determination that the IACA, as interpreted by the Indian Arts and 
Crafts Board (part of the Department of the Interior), was an unconstitutional 
regulation of commercial speech.s4 If the district judge had been correct, the court 
of appeals concluded, then trademark law as a whole would also be 
unconstitutional-a proposition so ludicrous that to state it was to refute it.s5 
This apparently easy victory for trademark infringement and cognate offenses, 
however, did not end the court's analysis. Rather, the court went on to address the 
merits of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board's interpretation of the IACA as 
prohibiting "the unqualified use of the term 'Indian' or ... of the name of an Indian 
tribe ... in connection with an art or craft product" on products not made by an 
Indian, as defined by the law. s6 First, the court suggested that government 
regulation could determine what was true or false about Indian arts and crafts: 
In effect the regulation makes "Indian" the trademark denoting 
products made by Indians, just as "Roquefort" denotes a cheese 
manufactured from sheep's milk cured in limestone caves in the 
Roquefort region of France. A non-Indian maker of jewelry 
designed to look like jewelry made by Indians is free to advertise 
78. [d. 
79. Id. 
80. 15 U.S.c. § I 052(d) (2000) (mark not registrable if"likely ... to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive"). An actual deception requirement would be difficult, especially in the context 
of intent-to-use applications. Even with marks used in commerce, the PTO lacks the resources to 
conduct a survey on consumer perceptions of a mark. 
81. 399 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2005). 
82. Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-10 (2000)). 
83. Native American Arts, 399 F.3d at 873 (quoting § 305e(a)). 
84. [d. at 873-74. 
85. [d. at 873. 
86. Id. at 873 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a)(2) (2006)). 
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the similarity but ifhe uses the word "Indian" he must qualify the 
usage so that consumers aren't confused and think they're buying 
not only the kind of jewelry that Indians make, but jewelry that 
Indians in fact made. There is no constitutional infirmity.87 
This language suggests significant government power over meaning, at least 
within reasonable bounds. 88 But Judge Posner then retreated substantially from this 
holding, ruling that the Board's regulation did not control the meaning of the law 
for a private lawsuit.89 Instead, the question of whether any particular use of 
"Indian" or tribal names was deceptive had to be submitted to the factfinder. 90 The 
Board lacked authority to determine what constitutes false advertising and 
particularly lacked expertise over what consumers-presumably non-Indian 
consumers-were likely to think when they saw advertising material. 91 Thus, the 
court affirmed the jury's finding that a non-Indian artist had not violated the IACA 
by producing "Indian-style jewelry that is advertised under such names as 'Navajo,' 
'Crow,' 'Southwest Tribes,' and 'Zuni Bear' and sold with tags that give 
information about the tribe.,,92 This finding is dubious on the merits-it is hard to 
see how other information provided with the jewelry could have dispelled the 
obvious implication ofTndian manufacture, especially when there was no explicit 
disclaimer-but more importantly, the court's conclusion retreats from the idea that 
some speech is simply inherently false or misleading. 
The holding that a factfinder must determine likely deception in every 
individual case seems consistent with much First Amendment jurisprudence. But 
it is also a guarantee of costly litigation and increases the likelihood that misleading 
speech will be excused, putting the burden of error on the producers of actual 
Indian-made jewelry. Moreover, even if courts borrow from defamation 
jurisprudence, they need not require totally individualized 
determinations-defamation law recognizes some false statements as defamatory 
per se, requiring no further proof of damage. Likewise, legislatures could determine 
that certain words or phrases actually have a particular meaning, and that ifthey are 
87. Id. at 873-74 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
88. One is reminded of Humpty Dumpty's statement, "When luse a word ... it means just what 
I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND 
WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE (1896), reprinted in MORE ANNOTATED ALICE 253 (Martin Gardner ed., 
Random House 1990). Humpty's statement is legitimate ifhe was trying to allow himselfroom to revise 
and alter his meaning at will without transparency to the people to whom he was speaking. By contrast, 
the Board's regulation-like countless definitions found in regulatory schemes-is an attempt to clariry 
and stabilize meaning. In either case, "[t]he question is ... which [person] is to be master." Id. But it 
is the government's ability to make clear and consistent rules that justifies its asserted mastery over 
meamng. 
89. See Native American Arts, 399 F.3d at 874. 
90. Id. at 874-75. 
91. See id. at 874. ("The meaning of 'Indian product' is plausibly within the scope of knowledge 
of an Indian Arts and Crafts Board-but not the requisites for proving consumer confusion, especially 
when it is not Indians, but non-Indians, who are the principal consumers offaux Indian products .... "). 
92. Id. at 873. 876. 
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used differently, that is deceptive. Such rules can even have useful information-
producing effects; consider the utility of having a uniform measure of how many 
miles a car gets per gallon, or how much "tar" is in a cigarette-both of which 
make comparisons easier for consumers than competing definitions. Ifthe meaning 
of "Cajun" or "Indian" is up for debate, then consumers have to invest more in 
learning the meaning of those terms as used in each individual case, or risk 
deception. 
Native American Arts highlights two other important aspects of the 
constitutionalization of trademark law. First, casting the IACA as a variant of 
ordinary trademark law narrows the interests sought to be protected, meaning that 
only consumer protection (and derivative protection for producers deemed authentic 
by the law) justifies the law. 93 Protections for Native American cultural heritage are 
lost, even though cultural protection was a major reason for enacting the IACA.94 
Cultural protection justifications could broaden and narrow the TACA in various 
ways, for example, by barring claims of authenticity for art produced by members 
of one tribe that imitates the traditional style of another tribe, but at the same time 
allowing claims of authenticity by Indian artisans who are not members of an 
enrolled tribe.95 This is part of a broader dynamic that encourages a regulation'S 
defenders to define their goal as avoiding falsity, since that is the only aim for 
which current First Amendment commercial speech doctrine has any sympathy. 
Second, to the extent that courts question the constitutionality of trademark 
law, they are more likely to do so in the context of laws that regulate the use of 
specific words-as was evident in Native AmericanArts. Government involvement 
in shaping the marketplace of speech seems much more salient when lawmakers 
have evaluated the deceptive potential of a particular word or set of words. In this 
regard, the trademark-like cases are similar to cases in which courts have struck 
down FDA rules about what health claims advertisers can make about supplements 
and drugs; there too, the courts have second-guessed agency determinations about 
deceptiveness, without questioning the idea that false advertising law in general is 
plainly constitutiona1.96 
The relatively greater suspicion courts reserve for administrative and legislative 
determinations about specific falsehoods indicates that the common law retains its 
persuasive pull as a baseline for regulating deceptive speech. But why is a jury 
verdict, which may be based on far less evidence than that available to a legislative 
93. See Jennie D. Woltz, Note, The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How Should the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 Be Marketed?, 17 FORDHAMTNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LT. 443, 
476-78 (2007) (comparing the IACA to trademark law and concluding that the lACA protects consumer 
interest at the expense of cultural heritage interests). 
94. See id. at 476-77 (arguing that the TACA has failed to protect cultural heritage). 
95. See id. at 478-79 (arguing that the TACA's definition of authentic may be both over- and 
under-inclusive). 
96. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(rejecting the FDA's determination 
that certain supplement claims were inherently misleading); Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F. 
Supp.2d II (D.D.C. 2000) (suggesting that much ofthe FDA regulation of health claims disseminated 
to doctors by drug companies could be unconstitutional). 
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body, more trustworthy than a legislative body's determination that a term is 
deceptive? A jury represents and defines government power, as First Amendment 
doctrines about other private causes of action recognize. 
To date, uncertainties in determining falsity have largely been avoided in the 
private lawsuit context by accepting the factfinder's determination of likely 
deception, ignoring error costs, and presuming irreparable harm to the trademark 
owner when the factfinder decides that confusion is likely. These are not 
satisfactory solutions from the perspective of First Amendment doctrine because 
they do not address the commercial speech distinction between potentially 
misleading and actually misleading. One could argue that "actually misleading" 
speech can be identified through a consumer surveyor anecdotal evidence from 
confused consumers. Even that would require a serious disruption ofthe currenttest 
for infringement, which is whether confusion is "likely" and which does not require 
evidence of actual confusion for a plaintiff to prevai1.97 Nor does commercial 
speech doctrine have anything like trademark's numerical threshold, in which 
confusion among a minority of consumers (around 20% in many cases) is enough 
to enjoin a defendant's use even if the majority of consumers get relevant 
information from the use. 
One possibility suggested by the lawyer regulation cases is that the difference 
between inherently misleading speech and potentially misleading speech in First 
Amendment doctrine is whether further disclosures can correct the misleading 
implications of the challenged speech. If that is the distinction, however, then 
consumer surveys are not useful to show actual misleadingness unless they also 
show that a disclaimer fails to correct the problem. Most surveys do not show 
"inherent" deception because they do not test disclaimers. 
C. Final Note on Intent 
Another big problem with trademark law from the perspective of mainstream 
First Amendment doctrine involves the role of intent. Historically, "passing off' 
involved deliberate deception by a competitor, although "the intent [to deceive] 
could be inferred from the circumstances.,,98 This requirement disappeared 
relatively early in the history of trademark law, but the trend in First Amendment-
governed doctrines such as libel (including trade libel and product disparagement) 
has been the opposite. Some degree of fault-at least negligence-is generally 
97. See. e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 
1986) (actual confusion is unnecessary to find infringement). 
98. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History a/the Concept a/Goodwill in TrademarkLaw, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 565-66 (2006). Trademark historically also used a property theory, granting 
exclusive rights in arbitrary or fanciful marks (known as technical trademarks) that had no relevance 
to the product before a seller adopted them.ld. at 567-72. Infringement of technical trademarks did not 
require proof of fraudulent intent because it was a violation of property rights, like a trespass.ld. at 560. 
Courts, however, still linked deception with infringement because use of an arbitrary mark on a 
particular product was likely to confuse consumers, and was not likely to be done accidentally or in 
good faith.ld. at 564-65,567. 
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required before liability can be imposed. This is an application of the narrow 
tailoring requirement that restrictions on speech be no greater than necessary to 
avoid the harm.99 Essentially, the judgment (rarely fully articulated) is that the gain 
in harm-prevention from banning mistaken but non-malicious, or non-negligent, 
speech is less than the cost of deterring speech that the speaker cannot verity with 
perfect certainty. One could balance the costs and benefits differently-a good faith 
but wrong belief that a drug cures cancer, for example, could do much more harm 
than its suppression would-but many trademark cases will not involve risks to 
health and safety from allowing the speech to continue. 
Intent requirements help decrease the chilling effects of speech prohibitions 
because they allow speakers to speak with confidence after a reasonable 
investigation. The price of freeing speech is that there is no liability even if the 
speakers are actually mistaken and their mistakes do harm. Currently, trademark 
law imposes liability for honest mistakes, creating great uncertainty among 
businesses. loo This uncertainty may be worth the information costs it exacts, but 
courts have yet to perform that balancing. No-fault liability combines with the other 
features of trademark law noted above to make trademark unusually indifferent to 
the costs of error, costs which are elsewhere considered to be constitutionally 
problematic when they affect truthful speech. 
TV. CONCLUSION 
Taking modern First Amendment doctrine seriously would have significant 
effects on the Lanham Act, affecting everything from the standard of proof to the 
definition of what counts as misleading. Trademark law's property-like features 
could insulate it from First Amendment transformation better than most types of 
false advertising law, but the constitutional constraints on libel law-which also 
protect property-like interests in reputation-show that property concepts are not 
a panacea. First Amendment protection for commercial speech against government 
regulation and private lawsuits is increasing simultaneously with trademark's 
expansion to new areas-from dilution to geographic indications. Courts adopting 
First Amendment principles to cabin expansive applications oftrademark law may 
thus find that the same reasoning reaches trademark's core commercial functions. 
The results are not foreordained. Courts may refuse to apply First Amendment 
99. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
100. Barton Beebe's empirical research indicates that intent is, in fact, central to many cases' 
outcomes. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multi/actor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 
94 CAL. L. REv. 1581, 1626-31 (2006). Nonetheless, as a matter of doctrine, intent to deceive 
consumers is unnecessary to a fmding oftrademark infringement. See id. Moreover, even when courts 
do evaluate intent, many look at the defendant's intent to copy the plaintiff, which is not the same thing 
as an intent to confuse the public. See A & H Sportswear, Inc. V. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 
198, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2000). There are numerous reasons a defendant might want to copy, especially 
in cases of descriptive terms that also have trademark meaning, or trade apparel that might increase the 
aesthetic appeal of the product or signal functional benefits. First Amendment doctrine's definition of 
intent generally looks to knowledge, recklessness, or even negligence, with respect to factual falsity, 
which is often easier for speakers to identify than consumer reaction to their speech. 
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commercial speech doctrine with the same rigor to the Lanham Act as they have 
when striking down other government regulations. After all, courts and legislatures 
have generally believed that there were good reasons to relax the common law 
standards requiring intentional fraud and proofthatthe trademark owner was losing 
sales to an infringer. 101 
I am largely in favor of core trademark infringement doctrine as it stands now; 
what I find problematic is special pleading for trademark. If modern trademark law 
is generally constitutional, then other forms of commercial speech regulation based 
on concerns for deception should also receive favorable treatment. Whether one 
prefers that courts should constitutionalize trademark law or cast a similarly 
favorable eye on other commercial speech regulations, it is important to recognize 
that trademark law is part ofthe modern regulatory apparatus. When we decide to 
allow consumer protection to trump freedom of commercial speech, we must do 
more than simply declare "false and misleading" commercial speech outside the 
boundaries of the First Amendment. Rather, multiple elements of the relevant 
statutory or regulatory scheme must be evaluated for how well they balance 
advertisers' interests in speaking truthfully with consumers' interests in avoiding 
falsehood. Examining the presumptions and burdens of proof found in trademark 
infringement law can thus provide useful lessons for other types of commercial 
speech regulation. 
101. See generally McKenna, supra note 61. 
